s Cornwallis finally assented,
with the proviso that, "if the Order of St. John shall not have raised
a sufficient number of men, the Neapolitan troops shall remain until
they shall be relieved by an adequate force, to be agreed upon by the
guaranteeing Powers." The question of the garrison having been
arranged, other details gave less trouble, and the Maltese question
was settled in the thirteen conditions added to Clause X. of the
definitive treaty.

Though this complex question was thus adjusted by March 17th, other
matters delayed a settlement.

Hawkesbury still demanded a definite indemnity for the Prince of
Orange, but Cornwallis finally assented to Article XVIII. of the
treaty, which vaguely promised "an adequate compensation." Cornwallis
also persuaded his chief to waive his claims for the direct
participation of Turkey in the treaty. The British demand for an
indemnity for the expense of supporting French prisoners was to be
relegated to commissioners--who never met. Indeed, this was the only
polite way of escaping from the untenable position which our
Government had heedlessly taken upon this topic.

It is clear from the concluding despatches of Cornwallis that he was
wheedled by Joseph Bonaparte into conceding more than the British
Government had empowered him to do; and, though the "secret and most
confidential" despatch of March 22nd cautioned him against narrowing
too much the ground of a rupture, if a rupture should still occur, yet
three days later, and _after the receipt of this despatch_, he signed
the terms of peace with Joseph Bonaparte, and two days later with the
other signatory Powers.[196] It may well be doubted whether peace
would ever have been signed but for the skill of Joseph Bonaparte in
polite cajolery and the determination of Cornwallis to arrive at an
understanding. In any case the final act of signature was distinctly
the act, not of the British Government, but of its plenipotentiary.

That fact is confirmed by his admission, on March 28th, that he had
yielded where he was ordered to remain inflexible. At St. Helena,
Napoleon also averred that after Cornwallis had definitely pledged
himself to sign the treaty as it stood on the night of March 24th, he
received instructions in a contrary sense from Downing Street; that
nevertheless he held himself bound by his promise and signed the
treaty on the following day, observing that his Government, if
dissatisfied, might refuse to ra