the change finds significant expression in the secret
instructions of November 14th. He is now charged to state George
III.'s determination "never to forego his right of interfering in the
affairs of the Continent on any occasion in which the interests of his
own dominions or those of Europe in general may appear to him to
require it." A French despatch is then quoted, as admitting that, for
every considerable gain of France on the Continent, Great Britain had
some claim to compensation: and such a claim, it was hinted, might now
be proffered after the annexation of Piedmont and Parma. Against the
continued occupation of Holland by French troops and their invasion of
Switzerland, Whitworth was to make moderate but firm remonstrances,
but in such a way as not to commit us finally. He was to employ an
equal discretion with regard to Malta. As Russia and Prussia had as
yet declined to guarantee the arrangements for that island's
independence, it was evident that the British troops could not yet be
withdrawn.

"His Majesty would certainly be justified in claiming the
possession of Malta, as some counterpoise to the acquisitions of
France, since the conclusion of the definitive treaty: but it is
not necessary to decide now whether His Majesty will be disposed to
avail himself of his pretensions in this respect."

Thus between September 10th and November 14th we passed from a
distinctly pacific to a bellicose attitude, and all but formed the
decision to demand Malta as a compensation for the recent
aggrandizements of France. To have declared war at once on these
grounds would certainly have been more dignified. But, as our Ministry
had already given way on many topics, a sudden declaration of war on
Swiss and Italian affairs would have stultified its complaisant
conduct on weightier subjects. Moreover, the whole drift of
eighteenth-century diplomacy, no less than Bonaparte's own admission,
warranted the hope of securing Malta by way of "compensation." The
adroit bargainer, who was putting up German Church lands for sale, who
had gained Louisiana by the Parma-Tuscany exchange, and still
professed to the Czar his good intentions as to an "indemnity" for the
King of Sardinia, might well be expected to admit the principle of
compensation in Anglo-French relations when these were being
jeopardized by French aggrandizement; and, as will shortly appear, the
First Consul, while professing to champion intern