devices of lobbying and log-rolling.

In pointing out this inconvenience attendant upon the American plan of
separating the executive and legislative departments, I must not be
understood as advocating the European plan as preferable for this
country. The evils that inevitably flow from any fundamental change in
the institutions of a country are apt to be much more serious than the
evils which the change is intended to remove. Political government is
like a plant; a little watering and pruning do very well for it, but
the less its roots are fooled with, the better. In the American system
of government the independence of the executive department, with
reference to the legislative, is fundamental; and on the whole it is
eminently desirable. One of the most serious of the dangers which
beset democratic government, especially where it is conducted on a
great scale, is the danger that the majority for the time being will
use its power tyrannically and unscrupulously, as it is always tempted
to do. Against such unbridled democracy we have striven to guard
ourselves by various constitutional checks and balances. Our written
constitutions and our Supreme Court are important safeguards, as
will be shown below. The independence of our executives is another
important safeguard. But if our executive departments were mere
committees of the legislature--like the English cabinet, for
example--this independence could not possibly be maintained; and the
loss of it would doubtless entail upon us evils far greater than those
which mow flow from want of leadership in our legislatures.[11]

[Footnote 11: In two admirable essays on "Cabinet Responsibility and
the Constitution," and "Democracy and the Constitution," Mr. Lawrence
Lowell has convincingly argued that the American system is best
adapted to the circumstances of this country. Lowell, _Essays on
Government_, pp. 20-117, Boston, 1890.]

We must remember that government is necessarily a cumbrous affair,
however conducted.

The only occasion on which the governor is a part of the legislature
is when he signs or vetoes a bill. Then he is virtually in himself
a third house.[12] As an executive officer the governor is far less
powerful than in the colonial times. We shall see the reason of
this after we have enumerated some of the principal offices in the
executive department. There is always a secretary of state, whose main
duty is to make and keep the records of state transactions