st be constant.'

[10] The account of the first analogy as a whole makes it
necessary to think that Kant in the first two sentences of
the proof quoted does not mean exactly what he says, what he
says being due to a desire to secure conformity with his
treatment of the second and third analogies. What he _says_
suggests (1) that he is about to discuss the implications,
not of the process by which we come to apprehend the manifold
as temporally related in one of the two ways possible, i. e.
either as successive or as coexistent, but of the process by
which we decide whether the relation of the manifold which we
already know to be temporal is that of succession or that of
coexistence, and (2) that the necessity for this process is
due to the fact that our _apprehension_ of the manifold is
always successive. The context, however, refutes both
suggestions, and in any case it is the special function of
the processes which involve the second and third analogies to
determine the relations of the manifold as that of succession
and that of coexistence respectively.

[11] Cf. B. 225, M. 137 (first half).

Now, if Kant's thought has been here represented fairly, it is open to
the following comments. In the first place, even if his position be
right in the main, Kant should not introduce the thought of the
_quantity_ of substance, and speak of the quantity as constant. For he
thereby implies that in a plurality of substances--if such a plurality
can in the end be admitted--there may be total extinction of, or
partial loss in, some, if only there be a corresponding compensation
in others; whereas such extinction and creation would be inconsistent
with the nature of a substance.[12] Even Kant himself speaks of having
established the impossibility of the origin and extinction of
substance.[13]

[12] I owe this comment to Professor Cook Wilson.

[13] B. 232-3, M. 141 fin.

In the second place, it is impossible to see how it can be legitimate
for Kant to speak of a permanent substratum of change at all.[14] For
phenomena or appearances neither are nor imply the substratum of which
Kant is thinking. They might be held to imply ourselves as the
identical substratum of which they are successive states, but this
view would be irrelevant to, if not inconsistent with, Kant's
doctrine. It is all very well to _say_ that the substratum is to be
found in