ile time, and consequently
everything which is in the internal sense, is continually flowing."[9]

[5] _Wahrgenommen._

[6] A. 182-4 and B. 225-7, M. 137-8. This formulation of the
conclusion is adapted only to the form in which the first
analogy is stated in the first edition, viz. "All phenomena
contain the permanent (_substance_) as the object itself and
the changeable as its mere determination, i. e. as a way
in which the object exists." Hence a sentence from the
conclusion of the proof added in the second edition is quoted
to elucidate Kant's meaning; its doctrine is as legitimate a
conclusion of the argument given in the first edition as of
that peculiar to the second.

[7] B. 225, M. 137.

[8] Cf. Caird, i. 541-2.

[9] B. 291, M. 176 (in 2nd ed. only). Cf. B. 277 fin.-278
init., M. 168 (in 2nd ed. only).

Kant's thought appears to be as follows: 'Our apprehension of the
manifold consists of a series of successive acts in which we apprehend
its elements one by one and in isolation. This apprehension,
therefore, does not enable us to determine that its elements are
temporally related either as successive or as coexistent.[10] In order
to determine this, we must apprehend the elements of the manifold as
related to something permanent. For a succession proper, i. e. a
change, is a succession of states or determinations of something
permanent or unchanging. A mere succession which is not a succession
of states of something which remains identical is an unconnected
series of endings and beginnings, and with respect to it, 'duration',
which has meaning with regard to changes, i. e. successions proper,
has no meaning at all. Similarly, coexistence is a coexistence of
states of two permanents. Hence, to apprehend elements of the manifold
as successive or coexistent, we must apprehend them in relation to a
permanent or permanents. Therefore, to apprehend a coexistence or a
succession, we must perceive something permanent. But this permanent
something cannot be time, for time cannot be perceived. It must
therefore be a permanent in phenomena; and this must be the object
itself or the substance of a phenomenon, i. e. the substratum of the
changes which it undergoes, or that of which the elements of the
manifold are states or modifications.[11] Consequently, there must be
a permanent substance of a phenomenon, and the quantity of substances
taken together mu