bjective and an objective
relation to other realities of the same kind.[29]

[29] Cf. pp. 137 and 231.

If we now turn to the passage under discussion, we find it easy to
vindicate the justice of the criticism that Kant, inconsistently with
the distinction which he desires to elucidate, treats the same thing
as at once the representation of an object and the object represented.
He is trying to give such an account of 'object of representations' as
will explain what is meant by a succession in an object in nature,
i. e. a phenomenon, in distinction from the succession in our
apprehension of it. In order to state this distinction at all, he has
to speak of what enters into the two successions as different. "It is
my business to show what sort of connexion in time belongs to the
_manifold_ in phenomena themselves, while the _representation_ of this
manifold in apprehension is always successive."[30] Here an element of
the manifold is distinguished from the representation of it. Yet Kant,
though he thus distinguishes them, repeatedly identifies them; in
other words, he identifies a representation with that of which it is a
representation, viz. an element in or part of the object itself. "_Our
apprehension_ of the manifold of the phenomenon is always successive.
_The representations_ of the parts succeed one another. Whether _they_
[i. e. _the representations_[31]] succeed one another _in the object_
also, is a second point for reflection.... So far as they [i. e.
phenomena], as representations only, are at the same time objects of
consciousness, they are not to be distinguished from apprehension,
i. e. reception into the synthesis of imagination, and we must
therefore say, _'The manifold of phenomena_ is always produced
successively in the mind'. If phenomena were things in themselves, no
man would be able to infer from the succession of the representations
how _this manifold_ is connected _in the object_.... The phenomenon,
in opposition to the representations of apprehension, can only be
represented as the object of the same, distinct therefrom, if it
stands under a rule, which distinguishes _it_ from every _other_
representation and which renders necessary a mode of conjunction of
the manifold."[32]

[30] The italics are mine.

[31] This is implied both by the use of 'also' and by the
context.

[32] The italics are mine.

Since Kant in introducing his vindication of causality thus identifies