of the teeth might have
been quite different from that which we know them to be, and the
construction of the stomach might have been greatly altered; and yet the
functions of these organs might have been equally well performed."

Thus much is needful to give an idea of the controversy. It is not here
our purpose to go more at length into the evidence cited on either side.
We simply wish to show that the question may be settled deductively.
Before going on to do this, however, let us briefly notice two
collateral points.

In his defence of the Cuvierian doctrine, Professor Owen avails himself
of the _odium theologicum_. He attributes to his opponents "the
insinuation and masked advocacy of the doctrine subversive of a
recognition of the Higher Mind." Now, saying nothing about the
questionable propriety of thus prejudging an issue in science, we think
this is an unfortunate accusation. What is there in the hypothesis of
_necessary_, as distinguished from _actual_, correlation of parts, which
is particularly in harmony with Theism? Maintenance of the _necessity_,
whether of sequences or of coexistences, is commonly thought rather a
derogation from divine power than otherwise. Cuvier says--"None of these
parts can be changed without affecting the others; and consequently,
each taken separately, indicates and gives all the rest." That is to
say, in the nature of things the correlation _could not_ have been
otherwise. On the other hand, Professor Huxley says we have no warrant
for asserting that the correlation _could not_ have been otherwise; but
have not a little reason for thinking that the same physiological ends
might have been differently achieved. The one doctrine limits the
possibilities of creation; the other denies the implied limit. Which,
then, is most open to the charge of covert Atheism?

On the other point we lean to the opinion of Professor Owen. We agree
with him in thinking that where a rational correlation (in the highest
sense of the term) can be made out, it affords a better basis for
deduction than an empirical correlation ascertained only by accumulated
observations. Premising that by rational correlation is not meant one in
which we can trace, or think we can trace, a design, but one of which
the negation is inconceivable (and this is the species of correlation
which Cuvier's principle implies); then we hold that our knowledge of
the correlation is of a more certain kind than where it is simply
indu