s view. The governments on both
sides could of course give no countenance to this theory; Bismarck
especially was very careful never to let it be supposed that he desired to
exercise influence over the internal affairs of his ally. Had he done so,
the strong anti-German passions of the Czechs and Poles, always inclined to
an alliance with France, would have been aroused, and no government could
have maintained the alliance. After 1880, the exertions of Count Kalnoky
again established a fairly good understanding with Russia, as was shown by
the meetings of Francis Joseph with the tsar in 1884 and 1885, but the
outbreak of the Bulgarian question in 1885 again brought into prominence
the opposed interests of Russia and Austria-Hungary. In the December of
this year Austria-Hungary indeed decisively interfered in the war between
Bulgaria and Servia, for at this time Austrian influence predominated in
Servia, and after the battle of Slivnitza the Austro-Hungarian minister
warned Prince Alexander of Bulgaria that if he advanced farther he would be
met by Austro-Hungarian as well as Servian troops. But after the abdication
of Alexander, Count Kalnoky stated in the Delegations that Austria-Hungary
would not permit Russia to interfere with the independence of Bulgaria.
This decided step was required by Hungarian feeling, but it was a policy in
which Austria-Hungary could not depend on the support of Germany, for--as
Bismarck stated--Bulgaria was not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian
grenadier. Austria-Hungary also differed from Russia as to the position of
Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria, and during 1886-1887 much alarm was caused by
the massing of Russian troops on the Galician frontier. Councils of war
were summoned to consider how this exposed and distant province was to be
defended, and for some months war was considered inevitable; but the danger
was averted by the renewal of the Triple Alliance and the other decisive
steps taken at this time by the German government (see GERMANY).[9]

Since this time the foreign policy of Austria-Hungary has been peaceful and
unambitious; the close connexion with Germany has so far been maintained,
though during the last few years it has been increasingly difficult to
prevent the violent passions engendered by national enmity at home from
reacting on the foreign policy of the monarchy; it would scarcely be
possible to do so, were it not that discussions on foreign policy take
place not in t