ine it in
its political bearings.

The proclamation of British supremacy over India by the Marquis of
Hastings, after the conclusion, in 1818, of the war with the Mahrattas
and Pindarrees, amounted to an assumption on the part of the Company of
the same position relative to the native powers, as had been held by the
monarchs of the house of Timoor--who, from the conquest of Delhi by
Baber, adopted the title of Padishah or emperor, as lords-paramount of
India, and lost no opportunity of enforcing the _imperial_ rights, thus
asserted, against the other Hindoo and Moslem princes among whom the
country was divided; till after a century and a half of incessant
aggressive warfare, Aurungzeeb succeeded in uniting under his rule the
whole of Hindostan and the Dekkan, from the Himalaya to Cape Comorin.
Less than half that period sufficed for the establishment of the
Anglo-Indian empire on a far firmer basis than that of the Moguls had
ever attained; and if the same claim of indefeasible _suzerainte_, which
was set forward by their Moslem predecessors, had been openly advanced
and avowed as a principle, as it has long been acted upon _de facto_, it
would have been at once far more candid, and far more intelligible to
the natives, than the course which has been pursued, of grounding every
aggression on some pretended infraction of a compulsory treaty. The
recent case of Gwalior affords a strong illustration of the point which
we are endeavouring to establish, as the relations of that state with
the supreme government have hitherto been different from those of the
Indian sovereignties in general.[19] While the other native princes
(with the exception only of the Rajpoot chiefs of Bikaneer, Jesulmeer,
&c., who lay beyond what might till lately be considered the British
boundary) had surrendered the military possession of their territories,
almost entirely, to subsidiary corps under the control of the Company,
the dynasty of Sindiah alone (though British influence had been more
sensibly exercised under the feeble rule of Jankojee than during the
life of Dowlut Rao) still preserved its domestic independence almost
untouched, and kept on foot a powerful army, besides the contingent[20]
which it was bound by treaty to maintain--the only other mark of
dependence being the obligation not to contract alliances hostile to
British interests. If we are to regard the late transactions in this
point of view, it will be difficult to justify the