ce longer,
unless the President sent him without delay ten thousand stand of arms
and forty cannons of _different calibre_. And all these last" (he
added, with a fine Hibernicism) "must be 24-pounders." Algiers hinted
that her money was in arrears, and Morocco intimated that her delay
in arranging terms was due simply to the full consideration which she
was giving to a matter so important.
Whatever other faults Y[=u]suf of Tripoli may have had, he was in this
matter as good as his word, and the six months' notice having been
fruitless, he proclaimed war on May 14, 1801, by chopping down the
flagstaff of the American Consulate. But the government of the United
States was weary of the old traditions followed by Christendom in its
dealings with these swashbucklers. They had by this time afloat a
small but effective squadron, and were very proud of the successes it
had gained in the _quasi_-war with France just ended. They were tired
also of a policy which was utterly at odds with their boast that all
men were born free and equal, and the nation was roused with the
shibboleth that there were "millions for defence, but not one cent for
tribute."
When the excitement had cooled, however, it seemed as if there was as
usual to be more in the promise than in the performance, for, though a
force existed sufficient for vigorous and decisive action, nothing was
accomplished during two years and more. Of the three squadrons sent
out, the first, under Dale, was hampered by the narrow restrictions of
the President's orders, due to constitutional scruples as to the
propriety of taking hostile measures before Congress had declared war;
and the second was unfortunate in its commander, though individual
deeds reflected the greatest credit upon many of the subordinate
officers. In 1803 the third squadron assembled at Gibraltar under the
broad pennant of Commodore Edward Preble, and then at last came the
time for vigorous measures.
The flag-officer's objective point was Tripoli, but hardly were his
ships gathered for concerted action, when the _Philadelphia_,
thirty-six guns, captured off the coast of Spain the _Meshboa_, an
armed cruiser which belonged to Morocco, and had in company as prize
the Boston brig _Celia_. Of course it was of the highest importance to
discover upon what authority the capture had been made; but the
Moorish commander lied loyally, and swore that he had taken the
_Celia_ in anticipation of a war which he was s
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