faction which originates therein, to the "rough" idea of a
reward of virtue and piety, coming from _without_, which, in order to
connect both, is in need of a God. And he again reaches that inconsequence
which from his metaphysical standpoint is entirely without motive, but as
to itself only worthy to be recognized, when in another formula of his
moral imperative he says: "Ever remember that thou art human, not _merely a
natural production_."

It is also this representation and realization of the _idea of the kind_,
which those who combine with their Darwinism a negation of theism have
mostly established before the appearance of the work of Strauss as the
highest moral principle, and to which they are also led most naturally by
Darwin's deduction of morality from the social instincts. Thus, Wilhelm
Bleek, in the preface to his "Ursprung der Sprache" ("Origin of Language"),
says (page XIII): "To aim at the inner and outer harmony of his genus in
one or the other way, and to promote the correct relations of the different
parts to one another in their reciprocal connections and in the greater
parts of the whole organism (family, community, nation), are the highest
visible designs of human existence, which must by themselves incite man to
noble actions and to virtuous deeds. In the performance of this task lies
the highest happiness which seems to be given to our species, a happiness
accessible by everyone in his own way. Neither the fruit of eternal
punishment nor the hope of an individual happiness, is really capable as a
truly saving idea to elevate man to a higher existence; even if we take no
account of the fact that {237} each of these two fundamental dogmas of the
vulgar dogmatism makes but refined egoism the lever of its ethics."

Haeckel alone, in his "Natural History of Creation," with his utterances as
to Christianity, morality, and the history of the world, again sinks down
to the level of the coarseness of Buechner, and even below it. On page 19,
vol. I, he entirely contests the reality of the moral order of the world,
and continues: "If we contemplate the common life, and the mutual relations
between plants and animals (man included), we shall find _everywhere_ and
_at all times_, the very opposite of that kindly and peaceful social life,
which the goodness of the Creator ought to have prepared for his
creatures--we shall rather find _everywhere_ a pitiless, most embittered
_struggle of all against all_. Nowher