ot the product of reflecting intelligence, but an ethical
action of that centre of human personality from which the spiritual process
of life in the individual comes forth--an ethical action of mind.

Herewith the position of theism in reference to the elimination of the idea
of design is also soon characterized: it is _the position of irreconcilable
antagonism_. In rejecting the position of its opponent, theism perceives
that it is in harmony not only with every correctly understood religious
need, but equally so with every scientific interest--with the interest of a
correct knowledge of nature, as well as with the interest of those sciences
which have to take care of and try to understand the spiritual and ethical
endowments of mankind.

If we now turn our attention to the _position of theism in reference to the
idea of design in general_, theism on its part also gives an equally firm
support to that intimate connection, proven by natural science, between
causality {286} and striving toward an end--between actiology and
teleology, as they are called in the language of the philosophical school.
While a contemplation of nature perceives in nature a mechanism governed by
laws and necessities, it finds results reached through this chain of
causality in which it must acknowledge ends toward which the preceding has
striven. Now, theism, on its part, proceeds from the highest end-appointing
cause of things and processes, and finds that the reaching of these ends
postulates a mechanism of natural conformity to law. In order to prove
this, we certainly must take a course which is prohibited by many as
anthropomorphism, _i.e._, we must try to study the connection of ends and
designs, and the possibility of such a connection where we are able to
observe in general not only the _accomplishment_ of purposes, but also the
_forming_ of purposes; and the only realm of this kind which we know of, is
the realm of human action. He who, merely through fear of anthropomorphism,
shrinks from this only possible comparison, may consider that for those who
assume a highest end-appointing cause (and we, too, proceed from this
standpoint) man also, who forms his designs and strives toward his ends, is
a product of that highest end-appointing cause; and that, therefore, in the
human striving toward an end, a certain analogue of the divine striving
toward an end must occur. We are, indeed, not obliged on this account to
identify the two, and to cl