rejected as anthropomorphisms, then
all reasoning and investigating is anthropomorphistic; and in that respect
we refer to what we had to say above, when treating of teleology (p. 170
ff.). The same Duke of Argyll whom we there had occasion to quote, in an
article in the "Contemporary Review" (May, 1871), upon "Variety as an Aim
in Nature," has admirably shown that it is the mind of man from which we
may draw conclusions as to the nature of the Creator, and that the picture
which we thus get of him, can at the same time be seen true and yet dim, at
the same time real and yet from a distance; for the human mind does not
feel anything so much as its own limitations, and therefore can easily
imagine each of his powers and talents as being present in the highest
being in infinite perfection. If Spencer had made this comparison, and
drawn the conclusions which follow from it for the nature of the final
cause of all things, the indiscernibleness of God would for him be reduced
to an unsearchableness, the unknowable be changed into an unsearchable, and
we could willingly acknowledge the humble modesty in regard to the infinity
of the deity, which his philosophy requires, as a factor of all true
religiousness. But we have to present to him as an expression, not only of
true religiousness, but also of true science, that passage of the Psalms:
"He that planted the ear, shall he {203} not hear? He that formed the eye,
shall he not see?" (Psalm XCIV, 9.)

Sec. 4. _Spinoza and Hegel in the Garb of Darwin: Carneri. Eduard von
Hartmann._

To the Austrian philosopher Carneri in his "Sittlichkeit und Darwinismus"
("Morality and Darwinism"), three books of Ethics, Vienna, Braumueller,
1871, we shall have to give a place of his own.

Inasmuch as religion and the beautiful are to him but a preliminary stage
of truth which has to dissolve itself into philosophy--a philosophy which,
inclined to monism, prefers to call itself pantheism--he takes a position
in reference to religion similar to that toward materialism, namely: a
negative position. But inasmuch as he still grants to religion in a
subjective sense, to "religion in the form of piety," a lasting position
and truth (religion, he says, has truth, but the positive God of religion
has no reality, page 114), and inasmuch as he ascribes to it not only a
transitory pedagogical value for the masses, which are not yet elevated to
the height of philosophic reasoning, but a value also for th