to my _Weltanschauung_.
Empiricism is known as the opposite of rationalism. Rationalism tends to
emphasize universals and to make wholes prior to parts in the order of
logic as well as in that of being. Empiricism, on the contrary, lays the
explanatory stress upon the part, the element, the individual, and
treats the whole as a collection and the universal as an abstraction. My
description of things, accordingly, starts with the parts and makes of
the whole a being of the second order. It is essentially a mosaic
philosophy, a philosophy of plural facts, like that of Hume and his
descendants, who refer these facts neither to Substances in which they
inhere nor to an Absolute Mind that creates them as its objects. But it
differs from the Humian type of empiricism in one particular which makes
me add the epithet radical.

To be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions
any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any
element that is directly experienced. For such a philosophy, _the
relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced
relations, and any kind of relation experienced must be accounted as
'real' as anything else in the system_. Elements may indeed be
redistributed, the original placing of things getting corrected, but a
real place must be found for every kind of thing experienced, whether
term or relation, in the final philosophic arrangement.

Now, ordinary empiricism, in spite of the fact that conjunctive and
disjunctive relations present themselves as being fully co-ordinate
parts of experience, has always shown a tendency to do away with the
connections of things, and to insist most on the disjunctions.
Berkeley's nominalism, Hume's statement that whatever things we
distinguish are as 'loose and separate' as if they had 'no manner of
connection,' James Mill's denial that similars have anything 'really' in
common, the resolution of the causal tie into habitual sequence, John
Mill's account of both physical things and selves as composed of
discontinuous possibilities, and the general pulverization of all
Experience by association and the mind-dust theory, are examples of what
I mean.[26]

The natural result of such a world-picture has been the efforts of
rationalism to correct its incoherencies by the addition of
trans-experiential agents of unification, substances, intellectual
categories and powers, or Selves; whereas, if empiricism had only bee