t; storing
itself up for the future; penetrating, like the joy of a fine day, into
our animal spirits, altering pulse, breath, gait, glance and demeanour;
and transfiguring our whole momentary outlook on life. But,
superficial or overwhelming, _this hind of satisfaction connected
with, the word Beautiful is always of the Contemplative order._
And upon the fact we have thus formulated depend, as we shall see,
most of the other facts and formulae of our subject.
This essentially unpractical attitude accompanying the use of the
word _Beautiful_ has led metaphysical aestheticians to two famous,
and I think, quite misleading theories. The first of these defines
aesthetic appreciation as _disinterested interest,_ gratuitously
identifying self-interest with the practical pursuit of advantages we
have not yet got; and overlooking the fact that such appreciation
implies enjoyment and is so far the very reverse of disinterested.
The second philosophical theory (originally Schiller's, and revived
by Herbert Spencer) takes advantage of the non-practical attitude
connected with the word _Beautiful_ to define art and its enjoyment
as a kind of _play._ Now although leisure and freedom from cares
are necessary both for play and for aesthetic appreciation, the latter
differs essentially from the former by its contemplative nature. For
although it may be possible to watch _other people_ playing football
or chess or bridge in a purely contemplative spirit and with the
deepest admiration, even as the engineer or surgeon may
contemplate the perfections of a machine or an operation, yet the
concentration on the aim and the next moves constitutes on the part
of the players _themselves_ an eminently practical state of mind,
one diametrically opposed to contemplation, as I hope to make
evident in the next section.
CHAPTER II
CONTEMPLATIVE SATISFACTION
WE have thus defined the word _Beautiful_ as implying an attitude
of contemplative satisfaction, marked by a feeling, sometimes
amounting to an _emotion,_ of admiration; and so far contrasted it
with the practical attitude implied by the word _good._ But we
require to know more about the distinctive peculiarities of
contemplation as such, by which, moreover, it is distinguished not
merely from the practical attitude, but also from the scientific one.
Let us get some rough and ready notions on this subject by watching
the behaviour and listening to the remarks of three imaginary
|