t with his
personal propensities. As a member of society he has a powerful motive
to attribute certain feelings to himself, and this motive acts as a bias
in disturbing his vision of what is actually in his mind. While this
holds good of lighter matters, as that of enjoyment just referred to, it
applies still more to graver matters. Thus, for example, a man may
easily persuade himself that he feels a proper sentiment of indignation
against a perpetrator of some mean or cruel act, when as a matter of
fact his feeling is much more one of compassion for the previously liked
offender. In this way we impose on ourselves, disguising our real
sentiments by a thin veil of make-believe.

So far I have spoken of an illusion of introspection as analogous to
the slight misapprehensions of sense-impression which were touched on in
connection with illusions of sense (Chapter III.). It is to be observed,
however, that the confusing of elements of consciousness, which is so
prominent a factor in introspective illusion, involves a species of
error closely analogous to a complete illusion of perception, that is to
say, one which involves a misinterpretation of a sense-impression.

This variety of illusion is illustrated in the case in which a present
feeling or thought is confounded with some inference based on it. For
example, a present thought may, through forgetfulness, be regarded as a
new discovery. Its originality appears to be immediately made known in
the very freshness which characterizes it. Every author probably has
undergone the experience of finding that ideas which started up to his
mind as fresh creations, were unconscious reminiscences of his own or of
somebody else's ideas.

In the case of present emotional states this liability to confuse the
present and the past is far greater. Here there is something hardly
distinguishable from an active illusion of sense-perception. In this
condition of mind a man often says that he has an "intuition" of
something supposed to be immediately given in the feeling itself. For
instance, one whose mind is thrilled by the pulsation of a new joy
exclaims, "This is the happiest moment of my life," and the assurance
seems to be contained in the very intensity of the feeling itself. Of
course, cool reflection will tell him that what he affirms is merely a
belief, the accuracy of which presupposes processes of recollection and
judgment, but to the man's mind at the moment the supremacy of thi