ion that "privilege of Parliament did not
extend to the case of publishing seditious libels."

In his life of Lord Camden,[7] who was Chief-justice of the Common Pleas
at the time, Lord Campbell expresses a warm approval of this resolution,
as one "which would now be considered conclusive evidence of the law."
But, with all respect to the memory of a writer who was himself a
Chief-justice, we suspect that in this case he was advancing a position
as an author engaged in the discussion of what had become a party
question, which he would not have laid down from the Bench.[8] The
resolution certainly did not make it law, since it was not confirmed by
any royal assent; and to interpret the law is not within the province of
the House of Commons, nor, except when sitting as a Court of Appeal, of
the House of Lords. We may, however, fully agree with the principle
which Lord Campbell at the same time lays down, that "privilege of
Parliament should not be permitted to interfere with the execution of
the criminal law of the country." And this doctrine has been so fully
acquiesced in since, that members of both Houses have in more than one
instance been imprisoned on conviction for libel.

The legality of the species of warrant under which Wilkes had been
arrested was, however, a question of far greater importance; and on that
no formal decision was pronounced on this occasion, the Lieutenant of
the Tower, in his return to the writ of _habeas corpus_, and the counsel
employed on both sides, equally avoiding all mention of the character of
the warrant. But it was indirectly determined shortly afterward. The
leaders of the Opposition would fain have had the point settled by what,
in truth, would not have settled it--another resolution of the House of
Commons. But, though it was discussed in several warm debates, Grenville
always contrived to baffle his adversaries, though on one occasion his
majority dwindled to fourteen.[9] What, however, the House of Commons
abstained from affirming was distinctly, though somewhat
extra-judicially, asserted by Lord Camden, as Chief-justice of the
Common Pleas. Wilkes, with some of the printers and others who had been
arrested, had brought actions for false imprisonment, which came to be
tried in his court; and they obtained such heavy damages that the
officials who had been mulcted applied for new trials, on the plea of
their being excessive. But the Chief-justice refused the applications,
and uph