specially in the case of ship-money claimed and exercised by
Charles I.; and it was affirmed that "the dispensing and suspending
power, and that of raising money without the consent of Parliament, were
precisely alike, and stood on the very same ground. They were born
twins; they lived together, and together were buried in the same grave
at the Revolution, past all power of resurrection." It was even argued
that the dispensing or suspending power was yet more dangerous than that
of raising money without a Parliamentary vote, since it was a power
which might do the most mischief, and with the greatest speed, so many
were the subjects which it included. It would be a return to the maxims
of the idolators of prerogative as understood in those earlier days,
that is, of absolute and arbitrary power, _a Deo Rex, a Rege Lex_. It
was farther argued that, unless it could be said that the moment
Parliament breaks up the King stands in its place, and that the
continuance of acts is consigned into his hands, he cannot of right
suspend any more than he can make laws, both acts requiring the same
power. The law is above the King, and the crown as well as the subject
is bound by it as much during the recess as in the session of
Parliament; and therefore the wisdom of the constitution has excluded
every discretion in the crown over a positive statute, and has
emancipated Parliament from the royal prerogative, leaving the power of
suspension, which is but another name for a temporary repeal, to reside
where the legislative power is lodged--that is, in King, Lords, and
Commons, who together constitute the only supreme authority of this
government. Precedents were cited to prove that in former times
different ministries had avoided thus taking the law into their own
hands, as when, in 1709 and again in 1756, there was a similar
apprehension of scarcity, even though both those years were years of
war. And the Bill of Rights was quoted as the statute in which every
sort of dispensing power was condemned, though, as exercised by James
II., it had only been exerted in dispensing with penal laws and
remitting penalties.
"Finally," said one speaker, who perhaps was Lord Mansfield himself, "he
is not a moderate minister who would rashly decide in favor of
prerogative in a question where the rights of Parliament are involved,
nor a prudent minister who, even in a doubtful case, commits the
prerogative, by a wanton experiment, to what degree the
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