that the Commons had voted the Lords a useless body.
They had now voted themselves so." And it would seem that the Lords
themselves, to a certain extent, retracted this, their self-denying
vote, when, before the end of the same session, they discussed Burke's
Bill for Economical Reform, and passed it, though it was a money-bill,
"containing extraneous enactments," and as such contravened one of their
own standing orders which had been passed in the beginning of Queen
Anne's reign, when the system of "tacking," as it was called, had
excited great discontent, which was not confined to themselves. The
propriety of rejecting the bill on that ground was vigorously urged by
the only two lawyers who took part in the debate, the Chancellor, Lord
Thurlow, and Lord Loughborough, whose object was avowedly thus to give a
practical proof that the Lords "had not voted themselves useless." But
even those who disregarded their advice fully asserted the right of the
peers "to exercise their discretion as legislators." We have noticed
this matter on a previous occasion. The privilege claimed by the
Commons, both as to its origin and its principle, has been carefully
examined by Hallam, who has pointed out that in its full exclusiveness
it is not older than Charles II., since the Convention Parliament of
1660 "made several alterations in undoubted money-bills, to which the
Commons did not object."[69] And, though his attachment to Whig
principles might have inclined him to take their part in any dispute on
the subject, he nevertheless thinks that they have strained both
"precedent and constitutional analogy" in their assertion of this
privilege, which is "an anomaly that can hardly rest on any other ground
of defence than such a series of precedents as establish a
constitutional usage." The usage which for two centuries was established
in this case by the good-sense of both parties clearly was, that the
Lords could never originate a money-bill, nor insert any clause in one
increasing or even altering the burden laid by one on the people, but
that they were within their right in absolutely rejecting one. But such
a right has a tendency to lapse through defect of exercise; and we shall
hereafter see that "the disposition to make encroachments," which in
this matter Hallam imputes to the Commons, has led them in the present
reign to carry their pretensions to a height which at a former period
had been practically ignored by the one House, and