lective franchise and enjoying a fair
reputation. *b In France the lives and liberties of the subjects would
be thought to be in danger if a public officer of any kind was entrusted
with so formidable a right. In New England the same magistrates are
empowered to post the names of habitual drunkards in public-houses, and
to prohibit the inhabitants of a town from supplying them with liquor.
*c A censorial power of this excessive kind would be revolting to
the population of the most absolute monarchies; here, however, it is
submitted to without difficulty.

[Footnote b: See the Act of February 27, 1813. "General Collection of
the Laws of Massachusetts," vol. ii. p. 331. It should be added that the
jurors are afterwards drawn from these lists by lot.]

[Footnote c: See Act of February 28, 1787. "General Collection of the
Laws of Massachusetts," vol. i. p. 302.]

Nowhere has so much been left by the law to the arbitrary determination
of the magistrate as in democratic republics, because this arbitrary
power is unattended by any alarming consequences. It may even be
asserted that the freedom of the magistrate increases as the elective
franchise is extended, and as the duration of the time of office
is shortened. Hence arises the great difficulty which attends the
conversion of a democratic republic into a monarchy. The magistrate
ceases to be elective, but he retains the rights and the habits of an
elected officer, which lead directly to despotism.

It is only in limited monarchies that the law, which prescribes the
sphere in which public officers are to act, superintends all their
measures. The cause of this may be easily detected. In limited
monarchies the power is divided between the King and the people, both
of whom are interested in the stability of the magistrate. The King
does not venture to place the public officers under the control of the
people, lest they should be tempted to betray his interests; on the
other hand, the people fears lest the magistrates should serve to
oppress the liberties of the country, if they were entirely dependent
upon the Crown; they cannot therefore be said to depend on either one
or the other. The same cause which induces the king and the people
to render public officers independent suggests the necessity of such
securities as may prevent their independence from encroaching upon
the authority of the former and the liberties of the latter. They
consequently agree as to the necessity o