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embly,--that the senate should, in its nature, be somewhat more permanent, and that the two houses should be completely independent of each other. These _principles_ are right--for the present we will suppose they will be supported--there then remains to be considered no considerable difference between the constitutional government which is proposed, and your present government, except that the time for which you choose your present rulers is only for six and twelve months, and the time for which you are to choose your continental rulers is for two, four and six years. The convention were mistaken if they supposed they should lessen the evils of tumultuous elections by making elections less frequent. But are your liberties endangered by this measure? Philosophy may mislead you. Ask experience. Are not the liberties of the people of England as safe as yours?--They are not as free as yours, because much of their government is in the hands of _hereditary majesty_ and _nobility_. But is not that part of the government which is under the control of the commons exceedingly well guarded? But still the house of commons is only a third branch--the _only_ branch who are appointed by the people--and they are chosen but once in _seven years_. Is there then any danger to be apprehended from the length of time that your rulers are to serve? when none are to serve more than six years--one whole house but two years, and your President but four. The great power and influence of an hereditary monarch of Britain has spread many alarms, from an apprehension that the commons would sacrifice the liberties of the people to the money or influence of the crown: but the influence of a powerful _hereditary_ monarch, with the national Treasury--Army--and fleet at his command--and the whole executive government--and one-third of the legislative in his hands constantly operating on a house of commons, whose duration is never less than _seven years_, unless this same monarch should _end_ it, (which he can do in an hour,) has never yet been sufficient to obtain one vote of the house of commons which has taken from the people the _liberty of the press_,--_trial by jury_,--_the rights of conscience, or of private property_. Can you then apprehend danger of oppression and tyranny from the too great duration of the power of _your_ rulers? THE LETTERS OF A CITIZEN OF NEW HAVEN, WRITTEN BY ROGER SHERMAN. Printed In The New Haven Gazette,
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