eck upon the other; they must act in
concert, and whether the power and influence of the one or the other is to
prevail, will depend on the character and abilities of the men who hold
those offices at the time. The senate is vested with such a proportion of
the executive that it would be found necessary that they should be
constantly sitting. This circumstance did not escape the convention, and
they have provided for the event, in the 2d article, which declares that
the executive may, on extraordinary occasions, _convene both houses or
either of them_. No occasion can exist for calling the assembly without
the senate; the words _or either of them_ must have been intended to apply
only to the senate. Their wages are already provided for, and it will be
therefore readily observed that the partition between a perpetuation of
their sessions, and a perpetuation of offices in the progress of the
government, will be found to be but thin and feeble. Besides, the senate,
who have the sole power to try all impeachments, in case of the
impeachment of the president are to determine, as judges, the propriety of
the advice they gave him as senators. Can the senate in this, therefore,
be an impartial judicature? And will they not rather serve as a screen to
great public defaulters?

Among the many evils that are incorporated in this new system of
government is that of congress having the power of making or altering the
regulations prescribed by the different legislatures respecting the time,
place and manner of holding elections for representatives, and the time
and manner of choosing senators. If it is enquired in what manner this
regulation may be exercised to your injury, the answer is easy. By the
first article the house of representatives shall consist of members,
chosen every second year by the people of the several states who are
qualified to vote for members of their several state assemblies; it can
therefore readily be believed, that the different state legislatures,
provided such can exist after the adoption of this government, will
continue those easy and convenient modes for the election of
representatives for the national legislature that are in use for the
election of members of assembly for their own states; but the congress
have, by the constitution, a power to make other regulations or alter
those in practice, prescribed by your own state legislatures; hence,
instead of having the places of elections in the precincts a