y one, possessing a thorough
knowledge of the situation of France, to say at what time Napoleon was
most likely to succeed, he must have pitched on the moment selected by
him. There are indeed many circumstances which induce me to suppose,
that the plan for his restoration had been partly formed before he left
Fontainbleau; for it is well known, that he long hesitated--that he
often thought of making use of his remaining force, (a force of about
thirty thousand men), and fighting his way to Italy; that his Marshals
only prevailed on him, and that he yielded to their advice, when he
might have thought and acted for himself. The conduct of Ney favours the
supposition: he selected for him the spot, of all others, the most
favourable for his views, should they be directed to Italy; he
stipulated for his rank, for a guard of veterans; he is described as
using a boldness and insolence of speech to Napoleon, which he would not
have dared to use, had there not been an understanding between them. He
covered his treachery by a garb of the same nature, when in presence of
his lawful Sovereign: open in his abuse of the usurper, while laying
plans to join him.

There is a very peculiar circumstance in Bonaparte's character, which
is, that at times, he makes the most unguarded speeches, forgetful of
his own interest. Thus, when the national guard of Lyons begged
permission to accompany him on his march, he said to them, "You have
suffered the brother of your King to leave you unattended--go--you are
unworthy to follow me." Thus, when at Frejus, he said to the Mayor,--"I
am sorry that Frejus is in Provence; I hate Provence, but I have always
wished your town well; and, _ere long, I will be among you again_." This
speech, which I had from the Prefect of Aix, who was intimately attached
to Napoleon and his interests, I know to be authentic. In it, even the
place of his landing seemed to be determined. One thing is certain, that
the plan, if not commenced before his abdication, was, at all events,
begun immediately after; for a long time must have been necessary to
arrange matters in such a manner that he should not find the slightest
opposition in his march to Paris.

I have thus attempted to give my readers some account of the state of
France under Napoleon. From this account, hastily written, they will
draw their own conclusions. Mine, attached as I am to one party; knowing
little of politics, only interested as a Briton in the fate