bout three
miles above Port Hudson. There he had a good view of the river,
yet nothing was to be seen of the _Hartford_ and _Albatross_.
Again, on the 24th, Dudley sent Magen with his troop to Hermitage
Landing. Pushing on with a few men, Magen got a full view of the
reach above Waterloo for five miles, but he too learned nothing of
the fleet. Farragut had in fact gone up the river on the 15th,
after vainly attempting to exchange signals with his ships below
and with the army, and was now near Vicksburg in communication with
Admiral Porter, engaged in concerting plans for the future. Before
getting under way he had caused three guns to be fired from the
_Hartford_. This was the signal agreed upon with Banks, but for
some reason it was either not heard or not reported.

Just before separating at Baton Rouge, Banks had handed to Farragut
a letter addressed to Grant, to be delivered by the Admiral in the
event of success. This letter, the first direct communication
between the two generals, Grant received on the 20th of March, and
from it derived his first information of the actual state of affairs
in the Department of the Gulf. After stating his position and
force Banks wound up by saying: "Should the Admiral succeed in
his attempt, I shall try to open communication with him on the
other side of the river, and, in that event, trust I shall hear
from you as to your position and movements, and especially as to
your views as to the most efficient mode of co-operation upon the
part of the forces we respectively command."

With the _Hartford_ and _Albatross_ controlling the reach between
Port Hudson and Vicksburg, as well as the mouth of the Red River
and the head of the Atchafalaya, Banks might now safely disregard
the movements of the Confederate gunboats. Accordingly, while
waiting for Grant's answer, he turned to the execution of his former
plan.

CHAPTER IX.
THE TECHE.

In effect, this plan was to turn Port Hudson by way of the Atchafalaya.
For the original conception, the credit must be given to Weitzel,
who seems indeed to have formed a very similar scheme when he first
occupied La Fourche. However, his force was, at that time, barely
sufficient for the defence of the territory confided to his care.
Not only was there then no particular object in moving beyond the
Atchafalaya, but any advance in that direction would have exposed
his little corps to disaster on account of the great facilities
afforded