thirteen days at Opelousas,
Banks began his march on Alexandria, it was with the earnest hope
of a speedy meeting of the two Union armies on the Mississippi;
then came the cipher telegram to exalt this hope into a firm and
just expectation of finding three weeks later an entire corps from
Grant's army at Bayou Sara, and as Banks mounted his horse to ride
toward the head of his column, it was with the fixed purpose of
being with his whole force at the appointed place at the appointed
time.

(1) "I sent several weeks ago for this class of steamers, and
expected them before this. Should they arrive and Admiral Porter
get his boats out of the Yazoo, so as to accompany the expedition,
I can send a force of say 20,000 effective men to co-operate with
General Banks on Port Hudson."--Grant to Farragut, March 23d;
received by Banks, April 21st. The cipher message that followed
seemed to Banks a confirmation of this.

CHAPTER XIV.
ALEXANDRIA.

Every one was in high spirits at the prospect of meeting the Army
of the Tennessee, and, to add to the general good-humor, just before
quitting Opelousas two pieces of good news became known.

Grierson rode into Baton Rouge on the 2d of May at the head of his
own 6th Illinois and Prince's 7th Illinois cavalry, together 950
horse. Leaving La Grange on the 17th of April, he had within
sixteen days ridden nearly 600 miles around the rear of Vicksburg
and Port Hudson and along the whole line of the Jackson and Great
Northern railroad. Beside breaking up the railway and the telegraph,
and destroying for the time being their value to the Confederate
army, Grierson's ride had an indirect effect, perhaps even more
important than the direct objects Grant had in view when he gave
his orders. That the railway should be rendered useless for the
movement of troops and supplies, and the telegraph for the transmission
of orders and intelligence, was of course the essential purpose of
the operation, yet no one could have foreseen the extent of the
confusion that followed, aided by Grierson's rapid movements, amid
the fluttering and distracted councils at Vicksburg. Thus it
happened that, when he heard of Grant's landing below Grand Gulf,
Pemberton actually thought himself menaced by the advance of Banks,
and this misapprehension was the parent of the first of those
mistakes of his adversary of which Grant made such good use.

Lieutenant Sargent,(1) the aide-de-camp sent to communicate with