erve, neither
firing nor under fire, while another third met a resistance so
light that its loss was no more than one per cent. of its numbers
--hardly more than it had suffered in the skirmishes of the day
before. Grover had eighteen pieces of artillery, of which but four
were in action; Taylor also had four guns of which he made good
use, and these, toward the close of the battle, were reinforced by
the five heavy guns of the _Diana_, of which, however, it is probable
that but one, or at most two, could be brought to bear.

The field of battle was so contracted that Taylor's strength sufficed
to occupy its front, while Grover was hindered or prevented from
deploying a force large enough to outflank and crush his antagonist
at a blow.

Viewed from a Confederate standpoint, the issue forms an instructive
example of the great results that may be achieved by a right use
of small forces. If, on the other hand, one turns to consider the
lost opportunity of Grover, two things stand out in strong relief:
the one, the positive disadvantage of employing forces, too large
for the affair in hand or for the scene of operations; the other,
that bold adventures must be carried boldly to the end.

Instead of making the campaign with four brigades and twenty-four
guns, as Weitzel's original plan had contemplated, Banks, for
greater security, set out with seven brigades and fifty-six guns.
So far as concerned the main body ascending the Teche, this excess
of strength could do no harm, but it was otherwise with the turning
column by the lake; for to the needless augmentation of the artillery
were directly due not only the day and night first lost, but also
the still more precious hours of daylight consumed in landing guns
that were not to fire a shot. Two brigades of infantry, with six
guns at most, landing at Indian Bend, and marching directly toward
the Cypremort, and quickly entrenching across both roads at or near
their upper fork, would have been enough to hold the position
against the best efforts of the whole of Taylor's army, with Emory
close on their heels; and thus Taylor must have been lost and the
war in Western Louisiana brought to an end. Consequences many and
far-reaching would have followed. Moreover, when it was determined
to use more than two divisions one of these was naturally Grover's,
and thus it happened that to Grover, who knew nothing of the country,
was assigned the delicate duty first cut out for Weit