grated to it by the Constitution "respecting the Territory of other
property belonging to the United States." This grant is preceded
in the Constitution by the language, "The Congress shall have power
to,"(93) etc.

The court entered the political field, though clothed only with
judicial power, one of the three distinct powers of the government.
For wise purposes executive, legislative, and judicial departments
were provided by the Constitution, each to be potential within its
sphere, acting always, of course, within their respective proper,
limited, constitutionally conferred authority.

"The judicial power shall extend to all _cases_ in law and equity
arising under this Constitution."(94)

This highest judicial tribunal, it is seen, passed from a case
wherein no jurisdiction, as it held, rested in the courts to enter
any form of judgment--not even for costs, to decide matters not
pertaining in any sense to the particular case, nor even to _judicial_
public rights of the people or the government, but wholly to the
political, legislative powers of Congress, not in any degree involved
in the jurisdictional question arising and decided. If it be said
that courts of review or error sometimes decide all the questions
made on the record, though some of them may not be necessary to a
complete disposition of the case before it, it must be answered
that this is most rare, if at all, where the case is disposed of,
as was the Dred Scott case, against the trial court's jurisdiction.
But, manifestly, the many political questions discussed at great
length in the opinions and formulated as _syllabi_ (quoted above)
for the case, did not and could not arise of record, and they were
not covered by assignments of error, and hence, whether the sole
question decided or to be decided was one of jurisdiction or not,
these questions can only be regarded as discussions--personal
opinions of the justices--not rising to the dignity of mere volunteer
opinions on matters of _law_; of no binding force even as _legal
precedents_, because outside of the case and record--not even
properly _obiter dicta_.

But slavery then dominated and permeated everything and everybody.
Why should the justices of the Supreme Court be free from its
influence? The Ordinance of 1787 was re-enacted by the First
Congress under the Constitution, and its slavery restriction clause
was enforced, without question, by Washington, Adams, Jefferson,
Madison, Monroe, an