his supreme
law. But the State Legislatures, as political bodies, however sovereign,
are yet not sovereign over the people. So far as the people have given
power to the General Government, so far the grant is unquestionably
good, and the Government holds of the people, and not of the State
governments. We are all agents of the same supreme power, the people.
The General Government and the State governments derive their authority
from the same source. Neither can, in relation to the other, be called
primary, though one is definite and restricted, and the other general
and residuary. The National Government possesses those powers which it
can be shown the people have conferred on it, and no more. All the rest
belongs to the State governments, or to the people themselves. So far as
the people have restrained State sovereignty by the expression of their
will, in the Constitution of the United States, so far, it must be
admitted, State sovereignty is effectually controlled. I do not contend
that it is, or ought to be, controlled farther. The sentiment to which I
have referred propounds that State sovereignty is only to be controlled
by its own "feeling of justice"--that is to say, it is not to be
controlled at all, for one who is to follow his own feelings is under no
legal control. Now, however men may think this ought to be, the fact is
that the people of the United States have chosen to impose control on
State sovereignties. There are those, doubtless, who wish they had been
left without restraint; but the Constitution has ordered the matter
differently. To make war, for instance, is an exercise of sovereignty;
but the Constitution declares that no State shall make war. To coin
money is another exercise of sovereign power; but no State is at liberty
to coin money. Again, the Constitution says that no sovereign State
shall be so sovereign as to make a treaty. These prohibitions, it must
be confessed, are a control on the State sovereignty of South Carolina,
as well as of the other States, which does not arise "from her own
feelings of honorable justice." The opinion referred to, therefore, is
in defiance of the plainest provisions of the Constitution.

There are other proceedings of public bodies which have already been
alluded to, and to which I refer again, for the purpose of ascertaining
more fully what is the length and breadth of that doctrine denominated
the Carolina doctrine, which the honorable member has now stood