they could venture to do so no
longer. The French had lost the best of their artillery, their
gunpowder was falling short, their provisions would barely
carry them to harvest time, and no more was to be hoped
for, since a convoy of ships which had sailed from France
at the end of winter, laden with supplies of all kinds, had
been captured by the English. The blockade of the St. Lawrence
was complete. The Western Indians would not fight, and even those
of the mission villages were wavering and insolent.

Yet Vaudreuil and Levis exerted themselves for defence
with an energy that does honor to them both. "Far from
showing the least timidity," says the ever-modest Governor,
"I have taken positions such as may hide our weakness from
the enemy."[835] He stationed Rochbeaucourt with three hundred
men at Pointe-aux-Trembles; Repentigny with two hundred
at Jacques-Cartier; and Dumas with twelve hundred at
Deschambault to watch the St. Lawrence and, if possible,
prevent Murray from moving up the river. Bougainville was
stationed at Isle-aux-Noix to bar the approach from Lake
Champlain, and a force under La Corne was held ready to
defend the rapids above Montreal, should the English attempt
that dangerous passage. Prisoners taken by war parties near
Crown Point gave exaggerated reports of hostile preparation,
and doubled and trebled the forces that were mustering against
Canada.

[Footnote 835: _Vaudreuil au Ministre, 22 Juin, 1760_.]

These forces were nevertheless considerable. Amherst had
resolved to enter the colony by all its three gates at once,
and, advancing from east, west, and south, unite at Montreal
and crush it as in the jaws of a vice. Murray was to ascend
the St. Lawrence from Quebec, while Brigadier Haviland forced an
entrance by way of Lake Champlain, and Amherst himself led the
main army down the St. Lawrence from Lake Ontario. This last
route was long, circuitous, difficult, andfull of danger from
the rapids that obstructed the river. His choice of it for his
chief line of operation, instead of the shorter and easier way
of Lake Champlain, was meant, no doubt, to prevent the French
army from escaping up the Lakes to Detroit and the other wilderness
posts, where it might have protracted the war for an indefinite
time; while the plan adopted, if successful, would make its capture
certain. The plan was a critical one. Three armies advancing
from three different points, hundreds of miles apart, by routes
fu