k place at Jacques-Cartier.

[Footnote 799: _Copie du Conseil de Guerre term par M. de Ramesay a Quebec,
15 Sept_. 1759.]

This event was the arrival of Levis. On the afternoon of
the battle Vaudreuil took one rational step; he sent a courier
to Montreal to summon that able officer to his aid.[800] Levis
set out at once, reached Jacques-Cartier, and found his worst
fears realized. "The great number of fugitives that I began
to meet at Three Rivers prepared me for the disorder in
which I found the army. I never in my life knew the like of
it. They left everything behind in the camp at Beauport; tents,
baggage, and kettles."

[Footnote 800: _Levis a Bourlamaque, 15 Sept_. 1759. Levis,
_Guerre du Canada._]

He spoke his mind freely; loudly blamed the retreat, and
urged Vaudreuil to march back with all speed to whence he
came.[801] The Governor, stiff at ordinary times, but pliant at
a crisis, welcomed the firmer mind that decided for him, consented
that the troops should return, and wrote afterwards in his despatch
to the Minister: "I was much charmed to find M. de Levis disposed
to march with the army towards Quebec."[802]

[Footnote 801: _Bigot au Ministre, 15 Oct. 1759. Malartic a Bourlamaque, 28
Sept_. 1759.]

[Footnote 802: "Je fus bien charme," etc. _Vaudreuil au Ministre, 5 Oct.
_ 1759.]

Levis, on his part, wrote: "The condition in which I found
the army, bereft of everything, did not discourage me, because
M. de Vaudreuil told me that Quebec was not taken, and that he had
left there a sufficiently numerous garrison; I therefore resolved,
in order to repair the fault that had been committed, to engage
M. de Vaudreuil to march the army back to the relief of the place.
I represented to him that this was the only way to prevent the complete
defection of the Canadians and Indians; that our knowledge of the country
would enable us to approach very near the enemy, whom we
knew to be intrenching themselves on the heights of Quebec
and constructing batteries to breach the walls; that if we
found their army ill posted, we could attack them, or, at any
rate, could prolong the siege by throwing men and supplies
into the town; and that if we could not save it, we could
evacuate and burn it, so that the enemy could not possibly
winter there."[803]

[Footnote 803: _Levis au Ministre, 10 Nov_. 1759.]

Levis quickly made his presence felt in the military chaos
about him. Bigot bestirred himself with his usual vigor