n two things. The first
is the acquired character of the apperceptive form evoked; it may
be a cadenza or a trill, a major or a minor chord, a rose or a violet,
a goddess or a dairy-maid; and as one or another of these is
recognized, an aesthetic dignity and tone is given to the object. But
it will be noticed that in such mere recognition very little pleasure
is found, or, what is the same thing, different aesthetic types in the
abstract have little difference in intrinsic beauty. The great
difference lies in their affinities. What will decide us to like or not
to like the type of our apperception will be not so much what this
type is, as its fitness to the context of our mind. It is like a word in
a poem, more effective by its fitness than by its intrinsic beauty,
although that is requisite too. We can be shocked at an incongruity
of natures more than we can be pleased by the intrinsic beauty of
each nature apart, so long, that is, as they remain abstract natures,
objects recognized without being studied. The aesthetic dignity of
the form, then, tells us the kind of beauty we are to expect, affects
us by its welcome or unwelcome promise, but hardly gives us a
positive pleasure in the beauty itself.

Now this is the first thing in the value of a form, the value of the
type as such; the second and more important element is the relation
of the particular impression to the form under which it is
apperceived. This determines the value of the object as an example
of its class. After our mind is pitched to the key and rhythm of a
certain idea, say of a queen, it remains for the impression to fulfil,
aggrandize, or enrich this form by a sympathetic embodiment of it.
Then we have a queen that is truly royal. But if instead there is
disappointment, if this particular queen is an ugly one, although
perhaps she might have pleased as a witch, this is because the
apperceptive form and the impression give a cerebral discord. The
object is unideal, that is, the novel, external element is
inharmonious with the revived and internal element by suggesting
which the object has been apperceived.

_Origin of types._

Sec. 29. A most important thing, therefore, in the perception of form
is the formation of types in our mind, with reference to which
examples are to be judged. I say the formation of them, for we can
hardly consider the theory that they are eternal as a possible one in
psychology. The Platonic doctrine on that point is a str