nt note was sounded by the organ of the
military party in Vienna. The _Militaerische Rundschau_, a few days
before the ultimatum to Servia, said:

"The moment is still favorable for us. If we do not decide
upon war, the war we shall have to make in two or three
years at the latest will be begun in circumstances much less
propitious; now the initiative belongs to us. Russia is not
ready, the moral factors are for us, might as well as right.
_Since some day we shall have to accept the struggle, let us
provoke it at once._"[39]

[Footnote 39: _Ibid._, No. 12.]

Before the Austrian ultimatum was issued there had been some
preliminary informal negotiations between Austria and Servia and the
latter had expressed its willingness to give to Austria the most ample
reparation "provided that she did not demand judiciary cooperation,"
and the Servian Minister at Berlin warned "the German Government that
it would be dangerous to endeavor by this inquiry (_i.e._, by the
participation of Austrian officials in the courts of Servia) to damage
the prestige of Servia."[40]

[Footnote 40: French _Yellow Book_, No. 15.]

It thus appears that Austria and Germany had warning in advance of the
issuance of the ultimatum that if this humiliating demand were
included it would meet with refusal. Their intention to precipitate
this war or impose their will upon Europe may therefore be measured by
the fact that, with full knowledge that that particular demand would
not be accepted, it was made a leading feature of the ultimatum, and
finally became the principal outstanding difference after Servia had
accepted substantially all the other demands of Austria. This was
reported by Cambon to his Foreign Office two days before the ultimatum
was issued and at that time Germany was fully advised as to the one
demand, which Servia could not in justice to its sovereignty accept.
In the same letter, Cambon advises his Foreign Office that Germany had
already issued the "preliminary warning of mobilization, which places
Germany in a sort of _garde-a-vous_ during periods of tension."[41]

[Footnote 41: _Ibid._, No. 15.]

A further corroboration of Germany's knowledge of the Austrian
ultimatum before its issuance is found in a report of the French
Minister at Munich to the French Foreign Office, written on the day
when the Austrian ultimatum was issued, and a full day before it
reached any capital except Berlin and Belgr