hrough his
kindness for the Jews, whom he came to liberate, to enlighten, and to
render the most happy of mortals. Being clothed with divine
omnipotence, he performs the most astonishing miracles, which do not,
however, convince the Jews. He can do every thing but convert them.
Instead of converting and liberating the Jews, he is himself
compelled, notwithstanding all his miracles, to undergo the most
infamous of punishments, and to terminate his life like a common
malefactor. God is condemned to death by the people he came to save.
The Eternal hardened and blinded those among whom he sent his own
Son; he did not foresee that this Son would be rejected. What do I
say? He managed matters in such a way as not to be recognized, and
took such steps that his favorite people derived no benefit from the
coming of the Messiah. In a word, the Deity seems to have taken the
greatest care that his projects, so favorable to the Jews, should be
nullified and rendered unprofitable!

When we expostulate against a conduct so strange and so unworthy of
the Deity, we are told it was necessary for every thing to take place
in such a manner, for the accomplishment of prophecies which had
announced that the Messiah should be disowned, rejected, and put to
death. But why did God, who knows all, and who foresaw the fate of his
dear Son, form the project of sending him among the Jews, to whom he
must have known that his mission would be useless? Would it not have
been easier neither to announce him nor send him? Would it not have
been more conformable to divine omnipotence to spare himself the
trouble of so many miracles, so many prophecies, so much useless
labor, so much wrath, and so many sufferings to his own Son, by giving
at once to the human race that degree of perfection he intended for
them?

We are told it was necessary that the Deity should have a victim; that
to repair the fault of the first man, no expedient would be sufficient
but the death of another God; that the only God of the universe could
not be appeased but by the blood of his own Son. I reply, in the first
place, that God had only to prevent the first man from committing a
fault; that this would have spared him much chagrin and sorrow, and
saved the life of his dear Son. I reply, likewise, that man is
incapable of offending God unless God either permitted it or consented
to it. I shall not examine how it is possible for God to have a Son,
who, being as much a God as him