hich belongs to it. However certain the
facts of any science may be, and, however just the ideas we may have
formed of these facts, we can only communicate false impressions to
others, while we want words by which these may be properly expressed.

To those who will consider it with attention, the first part of this
treatise will afford frequent proofs of the truth of the above
observations. But as, in the conduct of my work, I have been obliged to
observe an order of arrangement essentially differing from what has been
adopted in any other chemical work yet published, it is proper that I
should explain the motives which have led me to do so.

It is a maxim universally admitted in geometry, and indeed in every
branch of knowledge, that, in the progress of investigation, we should
proceed from known facts to what is unknown. In early infancy, our ideas
spring from our wants; the sensation of want excites the idea of the
object by which it is to be gratified. In this manner, from a series of
sensations, observations, and analyses, a successive train of ideas
arises, so linked together, that an attentive observer may trace back to
a certain point the order and connection of the whole sum of human
knowledge.

When we begin the study of any science, we are in a situation,
respecting that science, similar to that of children; and the course by
which we have to advance is precisely the same which Nature follows in
the formation of their ideas. In a child, the idea is merely an effect
produced by a sensation; and, in the same manner, in commencing the
study of a physical science, we ought to form no idea but what is a
necessary consequence, and immediate effect, of an experiment or
observation. Besides, he that enters upon the career of science, is in a
less advantageous situation than a child who is acquiring his first
ideas. To the child, Nature gives various means of rectifying any
mistakes he may commit respecting the salutary or hurtful qualities of
the objects which surround him. On every occasion his judgments are
corrected by experience; want and pain are the necessary consequences
arising from false judgment; gratification and pleasure are produced by
judging aright. Under such masters, we cannot fail to become well
informed; and we soon learn to reason justly, when want and pain are the
necessary consequences of a contrary conduct.

In the study and practice of the sciences it is quite different; the
false judgment