nd it, and I believe that I have
adequately supported all my representations on bases of relevant facts
which cannot be gainsaid or, at any rate, upon sound arguments which
have such facts for their foundations.

However, I am trying to hold myself open to conviction; and, this being
the case, if "the powers that be" in state or church feel that they must
proceed against me, I beg that, in justice to all the persons and
interests concerned, they will come with their resources of persuasion,
not coercion.

My appeal to the religious and political rulers to do this shall be in
the burning words of a celebrated defender of the capitalistic system of
economics, John Stuart Mill, words which constitute the most remarkable
passage in his powerful essay on Liberty:

No argument, we may suppose, can now be needed, against permitting
a legislature or an executive, not identified in interest with the
people, to prescribe opinions to them, and determine what doctrines
or what arguments they shall be allowed to hear.

Speaking generally, it is not, in constitutional countries, to be
apprehended, that the government, whether completely responsible to
the people or not, will often attempt to control the expression of
opinion, except when in doing so it makes itself the organ of the
general intolerance of the public.

Let us suppose, therefore, that the government is entirely at one
with the people, and never thinks of exerting any power of coercion
unless in agreement with what it conceives to be their voice.

But I deny the right of the people to exercise such coercion,
either by themselves or by their government. The power itself is
illegitimate. The best government has no more title to it than the
worst. It is as noxious, or more noxious, when exerted in
accordance with public opinion, than when in opposition to it.

If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person
were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in
silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be
justified in silencing mankind.

Were an opinion a personal possession of no value except to the
owner; if to be obstructed in the enjoyment of it were simply a
private injury, it would make some difference whether the injury
was inflicted on only a few persons or on many. But the peculiar