tain this he is ready almost to question the reality, as
he more than questions the necessity, of the existence of matter,
verging occasionally, on this point, upon Berkeley's views and style of
thinking. The constructive capacities of the intellect are inferred from
the variety of mathematical creations which it originates, as well as
from the more diverse and interesting structures which the never wearied
and ever aspiring fantasy is always building. Should any one question
the right of these creations to be, or seek to detract from their
importance, our author is ready to defend them to the utmost in contrast
with matter and its claims. Indeed, the author's exposition of his
doctrine of the Will is by itself an inconsiderable source of interest,
when separated from the views of all the functions of the spirit, which
are interwoven with it. In discussing the Will he is necessarily led to
treat of its relations to the other powers and functions of the spirit,
and hence by necessity to give his philosophy of the Soul. This
philosophy, briefly described, is one which regards the soul in its
nature and its acts, in its innermost structure and its outmost
energies, as capable of and destined to action. This in also its dignity
and its glory. The soul or spirit, so far from being the subject of
material forces, or the outgrowth of successive series of material
agencies, or the subtile product or potence of material laws, is herself
the conscious mistress and sovereign of them all, giving to matter and
development and law all their importance, as she condescends to use
these either as the mirror in which her own creations are reflected or
the vehicle by which her acts can be expressed.

How the author maintains and defends this position the limits of this
brief notice will not allow us to specify. The views expressed which
have the closest pertinency to the will are those which lay especial
stress upon the soul as capable of _wants_, and as thus impelled to
action. Emotion and sensibility neither of them qualifies for action.
_Want_ must supervene, to point to the unattained future, to excite to
change; and to this want knowledge also must be added, in order to
direct the activity. Under the stimulus thus furnished, the future must
be created, as it were, by the will of the soul itself, before it is
made real in fact.

We are not quite sure that we understand the author's doctrine of Want,
and its relations to the activitie