feelings; or we may, by the example of other people,
who actually suffer pain or enjoy pleasure, point out what we mean by
the words joy and grief. But how shall we explain to our young pupils,
a number of words which represent neither existing substances nor
simple feelings, when we can neither recur to experiment nor to
sympathy for assistance? How shall we explain, for instance, the words
virtue, justice, benevolence, beauty, taste, &c.? To analyze our own
ideas of these, is no easy task; to explain the process to a young
child, is scarcely possible. Call upon any man, who has read and
reflected, for a definition of virtue, the whole "theory of moral
sentiments" rises, perhaps, to his view at once, in all its elegance;
the paradoxical acumen of Mandeville, the perspicuous reasoning of
Hume, the accurate metaphysics of Condillac, the persuasive eloquence
of Stewart; all the various doctrines that have been supported
concerning the foundation of morals, such as the fitness of things,
the moral sense, the beauty of truth, utility, sympathy, common sense;
all that has been said by ancient and modern philosophers, is recalled
in transient perplexing succession to his memory. If such be the state
of mind of the man who is to define, what must be the condition of the
child who is to understand the definition? All that a prudent person
will attempt, is to give instances of different virtues; but even
these, it will be difficult properly to select for a child. General
terms, whether in morals or in natural philosophy, should, we
apprehend, be as much as possible avoided in early education. Some
people may imagine that children have improved in virtue and wisdom,
when they can talk fluently of justice, and charity, and humanity;
when they can read with a good emphasis any didactic compositions in
verse or prose. But let any person of sober, common sense, be allowed
to cross-examine these proficients, and the pretended extent of their
knowledge will shrink into a narrow compass; nor will their virtues,
which have never seen service, be ready for action.

General terms are, as it were, but the indorsements upon the bundles
of our ideas; they are useful to those who have collected a number of
ideas, but utterly useless to those who have no collections ready for
classification: nor should we be in a hurry to tie up the bundles,
till we are sure that the collection is tolerably complete; the
trouble, the difficulty, the shame of u