ing of the principle underlying the Liberal idea and
of its various applications. We have now to put the test question. Are
these different applications compatible? Will they work together to make
that harmonious whole of which it is easy enough to talk in abstract
terms? Are they themselves really harmonious in theory and in practice?
Does scope for individual development, for example, consort with the
idea of equality? Is popular sovereignty a practicable basis of personal
freedom, or does it open an avenue to the tyranny of the mob? Will the
sentiment of nationality dwell in unison with the ideal of peace? Is the
love of liberty compatible with the full realization of the common will?
If reconcilable in theory, may not these ideals collide in practice? Are
there not clearly occasions demonstrable in history when development in
one direction involves retrogression in another? If so, how are we to
strike the balance of gain and loss? Does political progress offer us
nothing but a choice of evils, or may we have some confidence that, in
solving the most pressing problem of the moment, we shall in the end be
in a better position for grappling with the obstacles that come next in
turn?
I shall deal with these questions as far as limits of space allow, and I
will take first the question of liberty and the common will upon which
everything turns. Enough has already been said on this topic to enable
us to shorten the discussion. We have seen that social liberty rests on
restraint. A man can be free to direct his own life only in so far as
others are prevented from molesting and interfering with him. So far
there is no real departure from the strictest tenets of individualism.
We have, indeed, had occasion to examine the application of the doctrine
to freedom of contract on the one hand, and to the action of
combinations on the other, and have seen reason to think that in either
case nominal freedom, that is to say, the absence of legal restraint,
might have the effect of impairing real freedom, that is to say, would
allow the stronger party to coerce the weaker. We have also seen that
the effect of combination may be double edged, that it may restrict
freedom on one side and enlarge it on the other. In all these cases our
contention has been simply that we should be guided by real and not by
verbal considerations,--that we should ask in every case what policy
will yield effective freedom--and we have found a close connection
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