sion of meaning, on the assent of will, must come through
liberty. Here is the sphere and function of liberty in the social
harmony.

Where, then, is the sphere of compulsion, and what is its value? The
reply is that compulsion is of value where outward conformity is of
value, and this may be in any case where the non-conformity of one
wrecks the purpose of others. We have already remarked that liberty
itself only rests upon restraint. Thus a religious body is not, properly
speaking, free to march in procession through the streets unless people
of a different religion are restrained from pelting the procession with
stones and pursuing it with insolence. We restrain them from disorder
not to teach them the genuine spirit of religion, which they will not
learn in the police court, but to secure to the other party the right of
worship unmolested. The enforced restraint has its value in the action
that it sets free. But we may not only restrain one man from obstructing
another--and the extent to which we do this is the measure of the
freedom that we maintain--but we may also restrain him from obstructing
the general will; and this we have to do whenever uniformity is
necessary to the end which the general will has in view. The majority of
employers in a trade we may suppose would be willing to adopt certain
precautions for the health or safety of their workers, to lower hours or
to raise the rate of wages. They are unable to do so, however, as long
as a minority, perhaps as long as a single employer, stands out. He
would beat them in competition if they were voluntarily to undertake
expenses from which he is free. In this case, the will of a minority,
possibly the will of one man, thwarts that of the remainder. It coerces
them, indirectly, but quite as effectively as if he were their master.
If they, by combination, can coerce him no principle of liberty is
violated. It is coercion against coercion, differing possibly in form
and method, but not in principle or in spirit. Further, if the community
as a whole sympathizes with the one side rather than the other, it can
reasonably bring the law into play. Its object is not the moral
education of the recusant individuals. Its object is to secure certain
conditions which it believes necessary for the welfare of its members,
and which can only be secured by an enforced uniformity.

It appears, then, that the true distinction is not between
self-regarding and other-regarding acti