ements of value secured by collective control distinct from
the elements of value secured by individual choice, so that within due
limits each may develop side by side?

We have already declined to solve the problem by applying Mill's
distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding actions, first
because there are no actions which may not directly or indirectly affect
others, secondly because even if there were they would not cease to be
matter of concern to others. The common good includes the good of every
member of the community, and the injury which a man inflicts upon
himself is matter of common concern, even apart from any ulterior
effect upon others. If we refrain from coercing a man for his own good,
it is not because his good is indifferent to us, but because it cannot
be furthered by coercion. The difficulty is founded on the nature of the
good itself, which on its personal side depends on the spontaneous flow
of feeling checked and guided not by external restraint but by rational
self-control. To try to form character by coercion is to destroy it in
the making. Personality is not built up from without but grows from
within, and the function of the outer order is not to create it, but to
provide for it the most suitable conditions of growth. Thus, to the
common question whether it is possible to make men good by Act of
Parliament, the reply is that it is not possible to compel morality
because morality is the act or character of a free agent, but that it is
possible to create the conditions under which morality can develop, and
among these not the least important is freedom from compulsion by
others.

The argument suggests that compulsion is limited not by
indifference--how could the character of its members be matter of
indifference to the community?--but by its own incapacity to achieve
its ends. The spirit cannot be forced. Nor, conversely, can it prevail
by force. It may require social expression. It may build up an
association, a church for example, to carry out the common objects and
maintain the common life of all who are like-minded. But the association
must be free, because spiritually everything depends not on what is done
but on the will with which it is done. The limit to the value of
coercion thus lies not in the restriction of social purpose, but in the
conditions of personal life. No force can compel growth. Whatever
elements of social value depend on the accord of feeling, on
comprehen