lf-year
which followed our receipt of the American offer of assistance, I think
we have nothing more lucid than this passage of Low's important work.
That the forces at work in Germany, which he described from the
vantage-point of a later date, were pretty clearly understood, even at
that time, by our Government, is proved, I think, by the tactics we
adopted throughout that troublous period.

In South Africa our troops, though amply strong, never adopted an
aggressive line. They defended our frontiers, and that defence led to
some heavy fighting. But, after the first outbreak of hostilities, our
men never carried the war into the enemy's camp. There was a
considerable party in the House of Commons which favoured an actively
aggressive policy in the matter of seizing the Mediterranean
strongholds ceded to Germany at the time of the invasion. It was even
suggested that we should land a great _Citizen_ army in Germany and
enforce our demands at the point of the sword.

In this John Crondall rendered good service to the Government by
absolutely refusing to allow his name to be used in calling out _The
Citizens_ for such a purpose. But, in any case, wiser counsels prevailed
without much difficulty. There was never any real danger of our
returning to the bad old days of a divided Parliament. The gospel of
Duty taught by the Canadian preachers, and the stern sentiment behind
_The Citizens'_ watchword, had far too strong a hold upon the country
for that.

Accordingly, the Government policy had free play. No other policy could
have been more effective, more humane, or more truly direct and
economical. In effect, the outworking of it meant a strictly defensive
attitude in Africa, and in the north a naval siege of Germany.

Germany had no Navy to attack, and, because they believed England would
never risk landing an army in Germany, the purblind camarilla who stood
between the Emperor's arrogance and the realities of life assumed that
England would be powerless to carry hostilities further. Or if the
Imperial Court did not actually believe this, it was ostensibly the
Government theory, the poor sop they flung to a disaffected people while
filling their official organs with news of wonderful successes achieved
by the German forces in South Africa.

But within three months our Navy had taught the German people that the
truth lay in quite another direction. The whole strength of the British
Navy which could be spared from south