to be of an essentially different complexion; he can always doubt his
creed. But his intimate persuasion is that the odds in its favor are
strong enough to warrant him in acting all along on the assumption of
its truth. His corroboration or repudiation by the nature of things
may be deferred until the day of judgment. The {96} uttermost he now
means is something like this: "I _expect_ then to triumph with tenfold
glory; but if it should turn out, as indeed it may, that I have spent
my days in a fool's paradise, why, better have been the dupe of _such_
a dreamland than the cunning reader of a world like that which then
beyond all doubt unmasks itself to view." In short, we _go in_ against
materialism very much as we should _go in_, had we a chance, against
the second French empire or the Church of Rome, or any other system of
things toward which our repugnance is vast enough to determine
energetic action, but too vague to issue in distinct argumentation.
Our reasons are ludicrously incommensurate with the volume of our
feeling, yet on the latter we unhesitatingly act.

Now, I wish to show what to my knowledge has never been clearly pointed
out, that belief (as measured by action) not only does and must
continually outstrip scientific evidence, but that there is a certain
class of truths of whose reality belief is a factor as well as a
confessor; and that as regards this class of truths faith is not only
licit and pertinent, but essential and indispensable. The truths
cannot become true till our faith has made them so.

Suppose, for example, that I am climbing in the Alps, and have had the
ill-luck to work myself into a position from which the only escape is
by a terrible leap. Being without similar experience, I have no
evidence of my ability to perform it successfully; but hope and
confidence in myself make me sure I shall not miss my aim, and nerve my
feet to execute what without those subjective emotions would perhaps
have been impossible. But suppose that, on the contrary, {97} the
emotions of fear and mistrust preponderate; or suppose that, having
just read the Ethics of Belief, I feel it would be sinful to act upon
an assumption unverified by previous experience,--why, then I shall
hesitate so long that at last, exhausted and trembling, and launching
myself in a moment of despair, I miss my foothold and roll into the
abyss. In this case (and it is one of an immense class) the part of
wisdom clearly is to