ng down its
lion-strength, I shall be more than rewarded for my pains.

To sum up: No philosophy will permanently be deemed rational by all men
which (in addition to meeting logical demands) does not to some degree
pretend to determine expectancy, and in a still greater degree make a
direct appeal to all those powers of our nature which we hold in
highest esteem. Faith, being one of these powers, will always remain a
factor not to be banished from philosophic constructions, the more so
since in many ways it brings forth its own verification. In these
points, then, it is hopeless to look for literal agreement among
mankind.

The ultimate philosophy, we may therefore conclude, must not be too
strait-laced in form, must not in all its parts divide heresy from
orthodoxy by too sharp a line. There must be left over and above the
propositions to be subscribed, _ubique, semper, et ab omnibus_, another
realm into which the stifled soul may escape from pedantic scruples and
indulge its own faith at its own risks; and all that can here be done
will be to mark out distinctly the questions which fall within faith's
sphere.

[1] This essay as far as page 75 consists of extracts from an article
printed in Mind for July, 1879. Thereafter it is a reprint of an
address to the Harvard Philosophical Club, delivered in 1880, and
published in the Princeton Review, July, 1882.

[2] At most, the command laid upon us by science to believe nothing not
yet verified by the senses is a prudential rule intended to maximize
our right thinking and minimize our errors _in the long run_. In the
particular instance we must frequently lose truth by obeying it; but on
the whole we are safer if we follow it consistently, for we are sure to
cover our losses with our gains. It is like those gambling and
insurance rules based on probability, in which we secure ourselves
against losses in detail by hedging on the total run. But this hedging
philosophy requires that long run should be there; and this makes it
inapplicable to the question of religious faith as the latter comes
home to the individual man. He plays the game of life not to escape
losses, for he brings nothing with him to lose; he plays it for gains;
and it is now or never with him, for the long run which exists indeed
for humanity, is not there for him. Let him doubt, believe, or deny,
he runs his risk, and has the natural right to choose which one it
shall be.

[3] Life of Ja