erm redeployment or surge of American combat forces to
stabilize Baghdad, or to speed up the training and equipping mission,
if the U.S. commander in Iraq determines that such steps would be
effective.

We also rejected the immediate withdrawal of our troops, because we
believe that so much is at stake.

We believe that our recommended actions will give the Iraqi Army the
support it needs to have a reasonable chance to take responsibility
for Iraq's security. Given the ongoing deterioration in the security
situation, it is urgent to move as quickly as possible to have that
security role taken over by Iraqi security forces.

The United States should not make an open-ended commitment to keep
large numbers of American troops deployed in Iraq for three compelling
reasons.

First, and most importantly, the United States faces other security
dangers in the world, and a continuing Iraqi commitment of American
ground forces at present levels will leave no reserve available to
meet other contingencies. On September 7, 2006, General James Jones,
our NATO commander, called for more troops in Afghanistan, where U.S.
and NATO forces are fighting a resurgence of al Qaeda and Taliban
forces. The United States should respond positively to that request,
and be prepared for other security contingencies, including those in
Iran and North Korea.

Second, the long-term commitment of American ground forces to Iraq at
current levels is adversely affecting Army readiness, with less than a
third of the Army units currently at high readiness levels. The Army
is unlikely to be able to meet the next rotation of troops in Iraq
without undesirable changes in its deployment practices. The Army is
now considering breaking its compact with the National Guard and
Reserves that limits the number of years that these citizen-soldiers
can be deployed. Behind this short-term strain is the longer-term risk
that the ground forces will be impaired in ways that will take years
to reverse.

And finally, an open-ended commitment of American forces would not
provide the Iraqi government the incentive it needs to take the
political actions that give Iraq the best chance of quelling sectarian
violence. In the absence of such an incentive, the Iraqi government
might continue to delay taking those difficult actions.

While it is clear that the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq is
moderating the violence, there is little evidence that the long-term
deployment of