of Assistance Programs

Congress should work with the administration to improve its ability to
implement assistance programs in Iraq quickly, flexibly, and
effectively.

As opportunities arise, the Chief of Mission in Iraq should have the
authority to fund quick-disbursing projects to promote national
reconciliation, as well as to rescind funding from programs and
projects in which the government of Iraq is not demonstrating
effective partnership. These are important tools to improve
performance and accountability--as is the work of the Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.

RECOMMENDATION 68: The Chief of Mission in Iraq should have the
authority to spend significant funds through a program structured
along the lines of the Commander's Emergency Response Program, and
should have the authority to rescind funding from programs and
projects in which the government of Iraq is not demonstrating
effective partnership.

RECOMMENDATION 69: The authority of the Special Inspector General for
Iraq Reconstruction should be renewed for the duration of assistance
programs in Iraq.

U.S. security assistance programs in Iraq are slowed considerably by
the differing requirements of State and Defense Department programs
and of their respective congressional oversight committees. Since
Iraqi forces must be trained and equipped, streamlining the provision
of training and equipment to Iraq is critical. Security assistance
should be delivered promptly, within weeks of a decision to provide
it.

RECOMMENDATION 70: A more flexible security assistance program for
Iraq, breaking down the barriers to effective interagency cooperation,
should be authorized and implemented.

The United States also needs to break down barriers that discourage
U.S. partnerships with international donors and Iraqi participants to
promote reconstruction. The ability of the United States to form such
partnerships will encourage greater international participation in
Iraq.

RECOMMENDATION 71: Authority to merge U.S. funds with those from
international donors and Iraqi participants on behalf of assistance
projects should be provided.

7. Budget Preparation, Presentation, and Review

The public interest is not well served by the government's
preparation, presentation, and review of the budget for the war in
Iraq.

First, most of the costs of the war show up not in the normal budget
request but in requests for emergency supplemental appr