thing of war postpones calling in the competent man until too
late. There have been in our time two instances of this plan, one
successful and the other a failure. In 1882 Mr. Gladstone's Cabinet
drifted against its will and to its painful surprise into the Egyptian
war. The Cabinet when it saw that war had come gave Lord Wolseley a
free hand and he was able to save them by the victory of Tel-el-Kebir. A
year or two later, being anxious to avoid a Soudan war, they drifted
slowly into it; but this time they were too late in giving Lord Wolseley
full powers, and he was unable to save Gordon and Khartoum solely
because he had not been called upon in time. The best analogy to the
course then pursued is that of a sick person whose friends attempt to
prescribe for him themselves until the disease takes a palpably virulent
form, when they send for a doctor just in time to learn that the
patient's life could have been saved by proper treatment a week earlier,
but that now there is no hope. For war requires competent management in
advance. There are many things which must be done, if they are to be
done in time, before the beginning of hostilities, and the more distant
the theatre of war the more necessary it may be to take measures
beforehand.

The management of a war can never be taken out of the hands of the
Government, because the body which decides when to make preparations
is, by the fact that it has the power of making that decision, the
supreme authority. If, therefore, a Nation wishes to have reasonable
assurance against defeat it must take means to provide the supreme
authority with a military judgment. The British system for a, long time
professed to do this by giving the Secretary of State for War a military
adviser who was Commander-in-Chief. Such a plan might have worked on
condition that the Secretary of State kept the Commander-in-Chief fully
informed of the state of negotiations with other Powers, and invariably
followed his advice in all matters relating to possible wars. The
condition has never been fulfilled, and for many years, as there were no
serious wars, the mischief of the neglect was not apparent except to the
few who understood war, and who have for many years been anxious. But in
1895 the present Cabinet began its career under the inspiration of Mr.
Balfour, who knows nothing of war, by giving the Secretary of State
absolute authority over the Army and all preparations for war so far as
the Army is c