ade of infantry with a battery of howitzers crossed the
Tugela at Potgieter's Drift and gained a line of hills to the north,
probably the edge of the plateau on which lies the Boer position. The
telegrams say nothing of bridge-making at Potgieter's Drift, but are
explicit as to the crossing of at least some of the artillery. On
Wednesday General Lyttelton shelled the Boer position with howitzers and
naval guns without drawing a reply. This silence of the Boer guns is
correct for the defenders of a position, as a reply would enable the
assailant to fix the position of the guns and to concentrate his fire
upon them. The same day (Wednesday) Warren's division crossed the Tugela
at Trichardt's Drift, and driving in the enemy's outposts secured a
lodgment on the low wooded hills about a mile north of the river; this
division, after its advance guard had crossed, was passed over by a
pontoon bridge. The remainder of yesterday may have been spent in
reconnaissance, bridge building--for an army that has crossed a river
needs to have behind it as many bridges as possible--in bringing up all
the forces destined for the battle, perhaps including Hildyard's
brigade, and in making complete arrangements for the attack which was
probably delivered this morning.
Sir Redvers Buller has aimed his blow in a right direction, for, if it
can be delivered with effect, if he can drive the Boers back, their army
will be in a perilous situation. The plan evidently is that while
Clery's division holds the Boers in front, Warren's should strike upon
their right flank. If, then, the combined attack of the two divisions
forces the Boers back the situation would be that the Boer army would
have to retreat eastward across the Klip River, its retreat in any other
direction being barred by the defences of Ladysmith, by Warren's and
Clery's divisions, and by the British force in the lines at Chieveley.
In such a situation a forced retreat would be disastrous for the Boers,
as Sir Redvers Buller's two divisions would be nearer to the Boer line
of retreat through Glencoe than the Boer army.
Of the probabilities of success it would be rash to speak. But though
numbers are against the British we must never forget the splendid
qualities which British troops have displayed in the past and which, as
the actions of this war have proved, are possessed by our officers and
men to-day. The experiences of the last few weeks have taught them what
are the formations
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