reunited and chivalrous nation. With
that innate love of virtue and real worth which has always
distinguished the American people, there has long been growing up,
even among those who were the fiercest foes of the South, a feeling
of love and reverence for the memory of this great and true-hearted
man of war, who fell in what he firmly believed to be a sacred cause.
The fame of Stonewall Jackson is no longer the exclusive property of
Virginia and the South; it has become the birthright of every man
privileged to call himself an American.

Colonel Henderson has made a special study of the Secession War, and
it would be difficult, in my opinion, to find a man better qualified
in every respect for the task he has undertaken. I may express the
hope that he will soon give us the history of the war from the death
of Stonewall Jackson to the fall of Richmond. Extending as it did
over a period of four years, and marked by achievements which are a
lasting honour to the Anglo-Saxon name, the struggle of the South for
independence is from every point of view one of the most important
events in the second half of the century, and it should not be left
half told. Until the battle where Stonewall Jackson fell, the tide of
success was flowing, and had borne the flag of the new Confederacy
within sight of the gates of Washington. Colonel Henderson deals only
with what I think may be called the period of Southern victories, for
the tide began to ebb when Jackson fell; and those who read his
volumes will, I am convinced, look forward eagerly to his story of
the years which followed, when Grant, with the skill of a practised
strategist, threw a net round the Confederate capital, drawing it
gradually together until he imprisoned its starving garrison, and
compelled Lee, the ablest commander of his day, to surrender at
discretion.

But the application of strategical and tactical principles, and the
example of noble lives, are not the only or even the most valuable
lessons of great wars. There are lessons which concern nations rather
than individuals; and there are two to be learnt from the Secession
War which are of peculiar value to both England and the United
States, whose armies are comparatively small and raised by voluntary
enlistment. The first is the necessity of maintaining at all times
(for it is impossible to predict what tomorrow may have in store for
us) a well-organised standing army in the highest state of
efficiency, and c