aid
that interference with the commander in the field is fraught with the
gravest danger."* (* Volume 1 chapter 7.)

The absolute truth of this remark is proved, not only by many
instances in his own volumes, but by the history of war in all ages,
and the principle for which Jackson contended when he sent in his
resignation would seem too well founded to be open to the slightest
question. Yet there are those who, oblivious of the fact that neglect
of this principle has been always responsible for protracted wars,
for useless slaughter, and costly failures, still insist on the
omniscience of statesmen; who regard the protest of the soldier as
the mere outcome of injured vanity, and believe that politics must
suffer unless the politician controls strategy as well as the
finances. Colonel Henderson's pages supply an instructive commentary
on these ideas. In the first three years of the Secession War, when
Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Stanton practically controlled the movements of
the Federal forces, the Confederates were generally successful.
Further, the most glorious epoch of the Confederacy was the critical
period of 1862, when Lee was allowed to exercise the full authority
of Commander-in-Chief; and lastly, the Northern prospects did not
begin to brighten until Mr. Lincoln, in March 1864, with that
unselfish intelligence which distinguished him, abdicated his
military functions in favour of General Grant. And yet while Lee and
Grant had a free hand over the military resources of their respective
nations the political situation suffered no harm whatever, no
extravagant demands were made upon the exchequer, and the Government
derived fresh strength from the successes of the armies.

The truth is that a certain class of civilians cannot rid themselves
of the suspicion that soldiers are consumed by an inordinate and
bloodthirsty ambition. They cannot understand that a man brought up
from his youth to render loyal obedience is less likely than most
others to run counter to constituted authority. They will not see
that a soldier's pride in his own army and in the manhood of his own
race tends to make him a devoted patriot. They do not realise that a
commander's familiarity with war, whether gained by study or
experience, must, unless his ability be limited, enable him to
accommodate his strategy to political exigencies. Nor will they admit
that he can possess a due sense of economy, although none knows
better than an educated sol