ful, Pope would not only fall back, but that he
would fall back in all the confusion which arises from a hastily
conceived plan and hastily executed manoeuvres. They had expected
that in his hurried retreat his army corps would lose touch and
cohesion; that divisions would become isolated; that the care of his
impedimenta, suddenly turned in a new direction, would embarrass
every movement; and that the general himself would become demoralised.

The orders and counter-orders, the marches and counter-marches of
August 28, and the consequent dispersion of the Federal army, are
sufficient in themselves to prove the deep insight into war possessed
by the Confederate leaders.

Nevertheless, the risk bred of separation which, in order to achieve
great results, they had deliberately accepted had not yet passed
away. Longstreet had indeed cleared the pass, and the Federals who
guarded it had retreated; but the main body of the Confederate army
had still twelve miles to march before it could reach Jackson, and
Jackson was confronted by superior numbers. On the plateau of Bull
Run, little more than two miles from the field of Groveton, were
encamped over 20,000 Federals, with the main number at Manassas. At
Centreville, a seven miles' march, were 18,000; and at Bristoe
Station, about the same distance, 11,000.

It was thus possible for Pope to hurl a superior force against
Jackson before Lee could intervene; and although it would have been
sounder strategy, on the part of the Federal commander, to have
concentrated towards Centreville, and have there awaited
reinforcements, now fast coming up, he had some reason for believing
that he might still, unaided, deal with the enemy in detail. The high
virtue of patience was not his. Ambition, anxiety to retrieve his
reputation, already blemished by his enforced retreat, the thought
that he might be superseded by McClellan, whose operations in the
Peninsula he had contemptuously criticised, all urged him forward. An
unsuccessful general who feels instinctively that his command is
slipping from him, and who sees in victory the only hope of retaining
it, seldom listens to the voice of prudence.

August 29.

So on the morning of the 29th Jackson had to do with an enemy who had
resolved to overwhelm him by weight of numbers. Nor could he expect
immediate help. The Federal cavalry still stood between Stuart and
Thoroughfare Gap, and not only was Jackson unaware that Longstreet
had broke